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OPINION OF THE COURT 
   
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 Mentally disabled and deemed incompetent to stand 
trial, Craig Geness was detained for nearly a decade before the 
homicide charge against him was ultimately dismissed.  His 
case exhibits inexcusable failures in Pennsylvania’s criminal 
justice and mental health systems.  While there is no doubt that 
Geness’s case languished for far too long, we are limited here 
to the narrow question whether the Administrative Office of 
Pennsylvania Courts (AOPC) may plausibly be held liable for 
his misfortune. 
 This appeal arises from AOPC’s motion to dismiss 
Geness’s claim under Title II of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12131, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The District Court denied AOPC’s motion, 
finding that AOPC does not have sovereign immunity.  For the 
reasons set forth below, we will reverse the District Court’s 
judgment and remand for dismissal of Geness’s Title II and 
Fourteenth Amendment claim against AOPC. 
I.  BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 The events leading up to this case reveal a breakdown 
in Pennsylvania’s criminal justice system.1  Geness is a 
 
 1  The following facts are taken from Geness’s Second 
Amended Complaint except where otherwise noted.   
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permanently mentally disabled individual in his early fifties.  
On November 17, 2006, he was detained after being charged 
with aggravated assault.  The charge was later amended to 
homicide.  This stemmed from an incident at Geness’s assisted 
living facility, McVey Personal Care Home, in Uniontown, 
Pennsylvania.  Geness v. Cox, 902 F.3d 344, 349 (3d Cir. 
2018).  A resident of the facility fell from the building’s porch 
and suffered serious injuries that resulted in his death a few 
weeks later.  Id.  Despite initial reports that the fall was an 
accident, the deceased resident’s daughter contacted police to 
share her suspicion that he might have been pushed.  Id. at 349.  
Police then initiated an investigation that led to the charge 
against Geness.  Id. at 349–50. 
 On June 18, 2007, a judge for the Court of Common 
Pleas of Fayette County deemed Geness incompetent to stand 
trial and ordered him transferred to a psychiatric hospital for 
no more than sixty days to ascertain his capacity to stand trial 
and his potential to regain competency.  Despite the judge’s 
order, Geness was not immediately transferred because, he 
avers, “the waiting list for beds for persons deemed 
incompetent to stand trial far exceeded the number of beds that 
DHS [the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services] had 
made available.”  App. 38 ¶ 17.  Approximately two months 
after the judge’s order was entered, and with no psychiatric 
evaluation undertaken, another judge again “deemed [Geness] 
incompetent to stand trial and directed that a motion be filed 
when Plaintiff was deemed competent to proceed.”  App. 38 ¶ 
19.   
 Another two months after that (approximately ten 
months after his arrest), Geness was finally transferred to a 
psychiatric facility where he underwent an evaluation on 
September 25, 2007 and was then returned to prison.  He was 
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deemed incompetent with a “poor” prognosis for 
improvement, yet no action was taken by the court, and he 
remained imprisoned for years to come.  App. 39 ¶ 21. 
 Throughout those years, his case was subject to the 
court’s monthly “call of the list.”  This is when a Court of 
Common Pleas judge reviews a list of all pending criminal 
matters that are ripe for trial, addressing each case individually 
and either continuing it or scheduling the trial.  The district 
attorney and public defender for each case attend this 
proceeding and provide the judge with relevant information. 
 In Geness’s case, the district attorneys “acquiesced to 
the repeated continuance” of his trial—and his public defender 
“made no attempt to have [Geness’s] case removed from the 
trial list, despite [his] known incompetency to stand trial” and 
despite the public defender’s “authority and [] opportunity” to 
make an appropriate request.  App. 40 ¶¶ 28, 30–31.  Nor did 
any of the six judges who at one time or another presided over 
the “call of the list” intervene throughout three years of 
monthly check-ins. 
 On November 23, 2010, the public defender 
representing Geness “filed a motion requesting that [his] trial 
be continued until [he] became competent.”  App. 41 ¶ 35.  
Less than a week later, a judge ordered his transfer from prison 
to a psychiatric institution “for a period not to exceed 90 days” 
to again evaluate his competency and potential to regain 
competency.  App. 41 ¶ 37.  Geness was never transferred 
pursuant to that order and remained in prison.  Once again, on 
August 17, 2011, a judge ordered a competency determination. 
 Finally, on September 4, 2011, approximately five years 
after Geness’s arrest, a second competency evaluation was 
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conducted, this time at the prison.  It was again determined that 
Geness was incompetent to stand trial and unlikely to improve.  
Later that month, a judge “ordered that [Geness] was not 
competent to stand trial and released him to be involuntarily 
committed to a Long Term Structured Residence (“LTSR”), 
there to remain without contact with the general public and to 
be returned to Fayette County Prison upon completion of his 
therapeutic program or upon a determination that he is 
competent to stand trial.”  App. 43 ¶ 48.  On September 22, 
2011, nearly five years after his arrest, Geness was transferred 
to a LTSR.  
 Approximately four years after that, with Geness’s case 
all the while subjected to the monthly “call of the list,” the 
Commonwealth “filed a proposed order for nolle prosequi all 
charges against the Plaintiff,” stating that he “will never be 
competent for trial and that substantive evidentiary issues 
existed which would impair the Commonwealth’s ability to 
meet its burden of proof.”  App. 43 ¶¶ 51, 53–54.  On 
December 10, 2015, a judge entered the order nolle prosequi 
all charges against Geness.  After nine years in custody without 
a trial, Geness was released.2 
 On June 17, 2016, Geness filed his original complaint 
against the County of Fayette, City of Uniontown, Jason Cox 
(formerly a Uniontown Police Department detective, now chief 
of police), and James and Jean McVey (owners of McVey 
Personal Care Home).  He brought an Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) and Fourteenth Amendment claim 
 
 2  Throughout Geness’s time in custody, his counsel 
filed four motions for habeas corpus and/or motions to dismiss 




against the county and city, various civil rights claims under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 against all defendants, and an intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claim against Cox and the 
McVeys. 
 On March 6, 2017, Geness moved for leave to amend 
his complaint to add the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as a 
party based on the same allegations.  The District Court denied 
his motion for leave to amend, finding it barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. 
 After various motions before the District Court, all 
defendants were dismissed except Detective Cox.  Following 
discovery, Cox filed a motion for summary judgment, which 
the District Court granted on May 1, 2017.  Geness appealed 
the summary judgment ruling on his § 1983 claims against Cox 
and the denial of his motion to amend his complaint to add the 
Commonwealth as a party.   
 On appeal, this Court affirmed the District Court’s grant 
of Cox’s summary judgment motion, reversed its denial of 
leave for Geness to amend his complaint to add the 
Commonwealth, and remanded for reinstatement of Geness’s 
claim under Title II of the ADA and the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 Geness subsequently amended his complaint to add a 
Title II and Fourteenth Amendment claim against the 
Commonwealth.  The Commonwealth then filed a motion to 
dismiss based on sovereign immunity, which the District Court 
denied.  The Commonwealth did not appeal the denial.  On 
March 27, 2019, Geness filed a Second Amended Complaint, 
the operative complaint, alleging Title II and Fourteenth 
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Amendment violations against three state defendants—the 
Commonwealth, as well as AOPC and DHS. 
 AOPC moved to dismiss based on sovereign immunity, 
and the District Court denied its motion.  AOPC timely 
appealed, and the District Court’s denial of AOPC’s motion to 
dismiss is now before us.  This appeal does not involve 
Geness’s claims against the Commonwealth or DHS; AOPC is 
the only appellant.   
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW3  
 We review de novo a motion to dismiss based on 
sovereign immunity.  Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 
F.3d 690, 694 (3d Cir. 1996).4  At the motion to dismiss stage, 
“we accept all well-pleaded allegations in the Complaint as 
true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving part[y].”  M.A. ex rel. E.S. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. 
of City of Newark, 344 F.3d 335, 340, 342 (3d Cir. 2003).  To 
survive a motion to dismiss, factual allegations “must be 
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” 
which “requires more than labels and conclusions.”  Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
III.  DISCUSSION 
 
 3  The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and we exercise 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
 4  Geness filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental 
appendix that contains materials that were not before the 
District Court.  At this stage of the litigation, we are 
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 The Eleventh Amendment renders States immune from 
any lawsuit “commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State.”  U.S. Const. amend. XI.  While 
the Amendment’s terms only apply to suits brought by citizens 
of another state, the Supreme Court has “repeatedly held that 
this immunity also applies to unconsented suits brought by a 
State’s own citizens.”  Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 517 
(2004).  This immunity further extends to “entities that are 
considered arms of the state.”5  Bowers v. NCAA, 475 F.3d 524, 
545 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 
519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997)).   
 Congress has the power to abrogate states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, thus permitting suits to proceed for 
specific claims, when it “unequivocally” expresses an intent to 
do so and validly exercises this power within the bounds of its 
authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 550.  
“When Congress seeks to remedy or prevent unconstitutional 
discrimination, § 5 authorizes it to enact prophylactic 
legislation proscribing practices that are discriminatory in 
effect, if not in intent, to carry out the basic objectives of the 
 
constrained to “the allegations contained in the complaint, 
exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public 
record,” and there is presently no reason to depart from this 
rule.  Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 
Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).  We therefore deny 
Geness’s motion, which would improperly expand the record 
on appeal.  
 
 5  It is undisputed that AOPC is an “arm of the 
Commonwealth.”  Appellant’s Br. 17.  
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Equal Protection Clause.”  Id. at 551 (quoting Lane, 541 U.S. 
at 520). 
 Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate 
sovereign immunity for claims brought under Title II of the 
ADA.  United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 154 (2006) 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12202, which states that “a State shall not 
be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States from an action . . . for a violation of this 
chapter.”).  The Title’s purpose, in part, is “to invoke the sweep 
of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the 
fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to 
address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by 
people with disabilities.”  42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4); see also 
Bowers, 475 F.3d at 550 (acknowledging Congress’s clear 
intent to abrogate sovereign immunity for Title II claims).   
 While Congress “must have a wide berth in devising 
appropriate remedial and preventative measures” under § 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, its power is not “unlimited.”  
Lane, 541 U.S. at 519.  The Supreme Court in Lane held that 
Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity for 
claims brought under Title II “as it applies to the class of cases 
implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts.”  Id. 
at 533–34.  That claim was brought by paraplegic individuals, 
one of whom was required to appear in a second-floor 
courtroom in a building with no elevator.  Id. at 513.  He 
crawled up the stairs of the courthouse to attend his first court 
appearance.  Id.  For his second appearance, he refused to crawl 
or be carried by officers.  Id.  He was “consequently arrested 
and jailed for failure to appear.”  Id.  The Court reiterated the 
principle that “within the limits of practicability, a State must 
afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard.”  
Id. at 532 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 
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(1971)).  But it limited its holding to Title II lawsuits that 
implicate “accessibility of judicial services,” deliberately 
leaving unanswered whether Congress validly abrogated 
sovereign immunity for “Title II’s other applications,” for 
example, “failing to provide reasonable access to hockey rinks, 
or even to voting booths.”  Id. at 530–31.   
 Subsequently, in Georgia, the Court made clear that 
courts analyzing whether Congress validly abrogated 
sovereign immunity for a Title II claim against a state or state 
entity must conduct a “claim-by-claim” analysis.  546 U.S. at 
159.  It accordingly established a three-part test for courts to 
determine whether sovereign immunity has been abrogated in 
a particular case: “(1) which aspects of the State’s alleged 
conduct violated Title II; (2) to what extent such misconduct 
also violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as 
such misconduct violated Title II but did not violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress’s purported 
abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is 
nevertheless valid.”  Id.   
 Here, we must apply this three-part test to determine 
whether Congress validly abrogated sovereign immunity for 
Geness’s claim against AOPC (and thus whether the claim may 
proceed).  Before we apply Georgia, we will first examine the 
extent to which our Court’s prior precedential opinion in this 
matter is controlling here, and we will examine the District 
Court’s decision on remand.  Pursuant to Georgia, we will 
reverse the District Court’s judgment and hold that AOPC 
retains its sovereign immunity because Geness has not stated a 
Title II claim against it. 
10 
 
A.  Our Court’s Prior Precedential Opinion 
 On August 28, 2018, our Court, inter alia, reversed the 
District Court’s denial of Geness’s motion for leave to amend 
his complaint to add the Commonwealth as a defendant.  We 
remanded the case for amendment of the Complaint and 
reinstitution of his Title II and Fourteenth Amendment claim. 
 In addressing whether the District Court should have 
permitted Geness to amend his Complaint, we analyzed 
whether his proposed Title II and Fourteenth Amendment 
claim against the Commonwealth would be futile, thus 
applying the same standard as a motion to dismiss (as we do 
here).6   We held that Geness’s proposed claim was not futile 
and should be permitted.  In the course of the analysis, we 
addressed each requirement of a Title II claim: 
To state a claim under Title II of 
the ADA, Geness must establish: 
“(1) he is a qualified individual; (2) 
with a disability; (3) who was 
excluded from participation in or 
denied the benefits of the services, 
programs, or activities of a public 
entity, or was subjected to 
 
 6  “The standard for assessing futility is the ‘same 
standard of legal sufficiency as applies under [Federal] Rule 
[of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6).’”  Great W. Mining & Mineral 
Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 175 (3d Cir. 2010) 




discrimination by any such entity; 
(4) by reason of his disability.” 
Geness, 902 F.3d at 361 (quoting Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 
171, 178–79 (3d Cir. 2018) and citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132).   
 We found that Geness met all four requirements of a 
cognizable Title II claim against the Commonwealth.  
Specifically, we noted that  
[r]egulations promulgated under 
the ADA require that the 
Commonwealth “shall ensure that 
inmates or detainees with 
disabilities are housed in the most 
integrated setting appropriate to 
the needs of the individuals,” 28 
C.F.R. § 35.152(b)(2) (emphasis 
added), and “[s]hall not place 
inmates or detainees with 
disabilities in inappropriate 
security classifications because no 
accessible cells or beds are 
available,” id. § 35.152(b)(2)(i). 
Id. at 361–62 (discussing several procedural protections 
“designed to avoid undue delays and safeguard the fair and 
efficient functioning of the criminal justice system,” the denial 
of which gives rise to a cognizable ADA claim). 
 With respect to the Title II claim, we concluded that 
“[a]s alleged, these multiple, protracted, and inexcusable 
delays in the handling of Geness’s examinations, transfers, and 
motions—resulting in nearly a decade of imprisonment and 
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civil commitment before a hearing was finally held on his 
habeas petition—are more than sufficient to state a claim under 
the ADA.”  Id. at 362. 
 We went on to find that the same circumstances gave 
rise to a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment: 
[T]he constitutional claims Geness 
seeks to bring against the 
Commonwealth as to both the 
length of his pretrial imprisonment 
and the length of his civil 
commitment would not be futile. 
After his first psychological 
evaluation indicated that he 
“remain[s] incompetent to stand 
trial,” . . . Geness was incarcerated 
for an additional three years before 
civil commitment proceedings and 
a second examination were even 
requested. And once 
institutionalized, Geness was left 
to languish for another four years 
before he was granted a hearing on 
his habeas petition and the charges 
against him were dismissed. There 
is no question this exceeded the 
“reasonable period of time 
necessary” under Jackson to 
ascertain whether there was a 
substantial probability Geness 




Id. at 363–64 (citation omitted). 
 When we published this opinion, however, AOPC was 
neither a party nor a contemplated party.  Thus, it is our task to 
square our prior holding that Geness stated a Title II and 
Fourteenth Amendment claim against the Commonwealth with 
Geness’s pleadings against AOPC.7  
B.  District Court on Remand 
 The District Court held that Geness sufficiently pleaded 
a Title II and Fourteenth Amendment claim against AOPC and 
that AOPC’s sovereign immunity was validly abrogated (i.e., 
that Geness’s claim could proceed).  It stated that “[a]t this 
preliminary stage and mindful Mr. Geness is not challenging 
judicial decision making but rather failures in court 
administration practices[,]” it would not dismiss his claim.   
Geness v. Commonwealth, 388 F. Supp. 3d 530, 534 (W.D. Pa. 
May 28, 2019).  And it noted that discovery may help clarify 
“the potential liability and damages among allegedly 
responsible state actors [AOPC, DHS, and the 
Commonwealth].”  Id.  (“AOPC’s argument of no 
involvement, or the more central involvement of the 
Department of Human Services, is based on facts requiring 
discovery on relative culpability.”).  
 
 7  The law of the case doctrine instructs that “one panel 
of an appellate court generally will not reconsider questions 
that another panel has decided on a prior appeal in the same 
case.”  In re City of Phila. Litig., 158 F.3d 711, 717 (3d Cir. 
1998).  We are thus bound by our prior opinion to the extent it 
bears upon the matter before us.  
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 In reaching this conclusion, the District Court found 
convincing Geness’s general allegation that “AOPC is 
responsible for ‘[e]nsuring accessible and safe courts for all 
citizens’ by ‘[e]nsuring that the courts of the Commonwealth 
comply with Title II.’”  Id. at 534 (quoting Second Am. Compl. 
¶ 7 (App. 36 ¶ 7)).  It also noted the following more specific 
allegations from his Second Amended Complaint: Geness 
alleged that AOPC “makes regular inquiries of each county’s 
ADA coordinator with regard to cases involving criminal 
defendants who are pretrial detainees whose cases have not 
been called to trial in a timely fashion,”  App. 45 ¶ 66, and that 
even though “AOPC repeatedly contacted the Fayette County 
court administrator directly to inquire about the Plaintiff’s case 
and the reasons for [his] extended incarceration without trial,” 
App. 45 ¶ 67, AOPC failed to take “any action designed to 
provide the Plaintiff with his right to be brought to trial on the 
charges that he faced,” App. 45 ¶ 67.  Further, Geness alleged 
that the Fayette County Court administrator, who serves as the 
ADA coordinator for Fayette County, received a daily list of 
prisoners that showed their length of incarceration—and that 
his name appeared on this list. 
 The District Court also focused on AOPC’s duties 
pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial Administration.  
These rules task AOPC with (1) “review[ing] the operation and 
efficiency of the system and of all offices related to and serving 
the system and, when necessary . . . report[ing] to the Supreme 
Court or the Judicial Council with respect thereto,” (2) 
“examin[ing] the state of the dockets and practices and 
procedures of the courts and of the magisterial district judges 
and mak[ing] recommendations for the expedition of 
litigation,” and (3) “prepar[ing] educational and training 
materials for system and related personnel and to conduct 
15 
 
educational and training sessions.”  Geness, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 
534 (quoting Pa.R.J.A. Nos. 505(1), (6), (12) (alterations in 
original)). 
 Considering all of this, the District Court concluded that 
“Mr. Geness plausibly pleads the AOPC could have helped 
him by exercising its duty to monitor the status of dockets and 
make recommendations to expedite litigation, ensure ADA 
compliance at a systemic level in the courts of the 
Commonwealth, and reporting to the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court.”  Id.  The District Court did not, however, explain how 
or at what point AOPC could or should have exercised these 
duties, given Geness’s acknowledgement that AOPC 
“repeatedly contacted the Fayette County Court administrator 
directly to inquire about the Plaintiff’s case and the reasons for 
the Plaintiff’s extended incarceration without trial,” App. 45 ¶ 
67, and that Geness “is not challenging judicial decision 
making,” Geness, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 532. 
 In summary, the District Court found that Geness had 
stated a viable Title II and Fourteenth Amendment claim 
because AOPC allegedly failed to take unspecified action to 
expedite his case and failed to take initiative to report the status 
of his case to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  The District 
Court thus concluded that it could not rule out AOPC’s Title II 
and Fourteenth Amendment liability as a matter of law and that 
AOPC therefore was not immune from suit.8 
 
 8  The District Court also addressed whether AOPC 
possessed quasi-judicial immunity and found that it did not.  Id. 




C.  Georgia Analysis 
 To determine whether Congress validly abrogated 
sovereign immunity for Geness’s Title II and Fourteenth 
Amendment claim against AOPC, we must apply the three-part 
Georgia test.9  The District Court, without explicitly noting 
that it was applying Georgia, concluded that the first and 
second inquiries were satisfied, thus permitting the claim 
against AOPC to proceed.  Pursuant to the analysis below, we 
disagree with the District Court and conclude that Geness has 
failed to satisfy the first requirement of Georgia because he 
failed to set forth a plausible claim that AOPC violated Title II.  
Because Geness’s allegations fail to satisfy Georgia’s first 
requirement, we need not address the second and third 
requirements. 
 To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, in 
satisfaction of the first Georgia requirement, a party must 
sufficiently plead that “(1) he is a qualified individual; (2) with 
a disability; (3) who was excluded from participation in or 
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a 
public entity, or was subjected to discrimination by any such 
entity; (4) by reason of his disability.”10  Geness, 902 F.3d at 
 
 9  As noted above, this test requires courts to examine 
“(1) which aspects of the State’s alleged conduct violated Title 
II; (2) to what extent such misconduct also violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such misconduct 
violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, 
whether Congress’s purported abrogation of sovereign 
immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid.”  
Georgia, 546 U.S. at 159.   
 10  It is undisputed that AOPC is a “public entity.”  See 
42 U.S.C. § 1231(1)(B) (stating that public entities include 
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361 (quoting Haberle, 885 F.3d at 178–79); 42 U.S.C. § 
12132.11  In our prior precedential opinion, we concluded that 
the first and second requirements were satisfied, as well as the 
third and fourth requirements as they relate to the 
Commonwealth.  Id. at 361–62.  We must now determine 
whether AOPC denied Geness “the benefits of [its] services, 
programs, or activities . . . by reason of his disability.”  Id. 
 The following are Geness’s allegations regarding 
AOPC, drawn directly from his Second Amended Complaint:12 
 
“any department, agency, special purpose district, or other 
instrumentality of a State or States or local government”). 
 
 11  A plaintiff seeking compensatory damages under the 
ADA must also sufficiently allege that the public entity 
intentionally discriminated against him or her.  Haberle, 885 
F.3d at 181.  To satisfy this element of intentional 
discrimination, a plaintiff must allege at least “deliberate 
indifference,” which requires “(1) knowledge that a federally 
protected right is substantially likely to be violated . . . and (2) 
failure to act despite that knowledge.”  Id. (quoting S.H. ex rel. 
Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 265 (3d Cir. 
2013)) (alteration in original); see also Geness, 902 F.3d at 362 
n.13.  We will not address deliberate indifference here because 
we hold that Geness’s allegations fail to satisfy Title II’s other 
requirements. 
 
 12  Geness’s Second Amended Complaint also links 
AOPC’s alleged wrongdoing to the conduct of judges in their 
disposition of his case.  See, e.g., App. 43 ¶ 52 (“The above-
described Judges continued to permit Plaintiff’s case to be 
listed for trial, despite their actual knowledge of his 
18 
 
• “Defendant AOPC is a subsidiary unit of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and as such acts as an 
agent of the Commonwealth in various matters related 
to supervision and administration of the Pennsylvania 
Unified Judicial System.  The Pennsylvania Unified 
Judicial System includes judges of the Court of 
Common Pleas of the various Pennsylvania counties, 
including Fayette County.  In its capacity as a subsidiary 
unit of the Commonwealth, AOPC administers the 
Pennsylvania Unified Judicial System and is 
responsible for the prompt and proper disposition of all 
business of the courts of the Commonwealth of 
 
incompetency.”).  Allegations of wrongdoing based on judicial 
conduct are omitted here because AOPC’s administrative 
functions and the independent role of the judiciary must not be 
conflated.  See Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (“The doctrine of judicial immunity is founded upon 
the premise that a judge, in performing his or her judicial 
duties, should be free to act upon his or her convictions without 
threat of suit for damages.”).  The parties do not present and 
we are not aware of any legal authority that would permit 
AOPC to be found liable based on judicial conduct.  Further, 
Geness acknowledges that AOPC cannot be held liable based 
on judges’ decision-making.  Appellee’s Br. 25 (“The AOPC 
does not have oversight over criminal cases and the decisions 
that are required in each such case to the extent that those are 
duties to be performed by the Judges of the Common Pleas 
Court. . . . AOPC does in fact have the duty to oversee the 
actions of those Judges to ensure that, among other things, the 





Pennsylvania.  Among the duties and responsibilities of 
the AOPC is insuring accessible and safe courts for all 
citizens.  The duties of the AOPC include insuring that 
the courts of the Commonwealth comply with Title II of 
the [ADA].  The AOPC attempts to insure compliance 
with the ADA through interaction with ADA 
coordinators in each county of the Commonwealth.  For 
Fayette County, Pennsylvania, the role of AOPC ADA 
coordinator is filled by the deputy court administrator, 
who reports directly to the court administrator.”  App. 
36 ¶ 7. 
 
• “AOPC, through the Fayette County Court of Common 
Pleas . . . discriminated against [him] because of his 
disability by depriving him of the administration of 
judicial services and the normal benefits of criminal 
procedure and due process of the law.”  App. 44 ¶ 61. 
  
• “As part of its effort to fulfill its responsibility to insure 
the Commonwealth’s compliance with the ADA, 
Defendant AOPC makes regular inquires of each 
county’s ADA coordinator with regard to cases 
involving criminal defendants who are pretrial 
detainees whose cases have not been called to trial in a 
timely fashion according to Pennsylvania law.”  App. 
45 ¶ 66.   
 
• “Defendant AOPC repeatedly contacted the Fayette 
County court administrator directly to inquire about the 
Plaintiff’s case and the reasons for the Plaintiff’s 
extended incarceration without trial.  Notwithstanding 
that those inquiries were made by Defendant AOPC, 
neither the AOPC, nor any other agent of AOPC, 
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including the AOPC’s local ADA coordinator in Fayette 
County, took any action designed to provide the 
Plaintiff with his right to be brought to trial on the 
charges he faced.”  App. 45 ¶ 67.   
 
• “During the period of Plaintiff’s incarceration, the 
Fayette County ADA coordinator was the assistant 
court administrator.  At all times relevant to this case, 
the assistant court administrator reported directly to the 
court administrator.”  App. 45 ¶ 68. 
 
• “During the period of Plaintiff’s incarceration . . . , the 
Fayette County court administrator received from the 
Fayette County Prison a daily list of prisoners 
incarcerated in the Fayette County Prison.  This list 
included various information about each incarcerated 
individual, including the date that the individual was 
incarcerated, as well as the minimum and maximum 
incarceration dates for each prisoner.”  App. 45–46 ¶ 69. 
 
• “On each of the daily lists sent from the prison to the 
court administrator, Plaintiff Craig Geness appeared 
together with information about his incarceration 
described above.”  App. 46 ¶ 70. 
 
• The AOPC’s conduct, described above, “deprived 
[Geness] of his right to the justice system, which is 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.”  App. 47 ¶ 82. 
 Identifying AOPC’s “services, programs, or activities” 
at the foundation of Geness’s Title II claim is a necessary first 
step to determining whether his claim is cognizable.  See 
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Disability Rights N.J., Inc. v. Comm’r, N.J. Dep’t of Human 
Servs., 796 F.3d 293, 301–03 (3d Cir. 2015).  “[T]he phrase 
‘service, program, or activity’ under Title II . . . is ‘extremely 
broad in scope and includes anything a public entity does.’”  
Furgess v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 933 F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 2019) 
(quoting Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 301).   
 In Disability Rights, this Court identified the alleged 
“service, program, or activity” as a judicial hearing before a 
mentally ill person can be forcibly medicated in a nonemergent 
situation.  Id. at 303–04, 307 (holding that “judicial process 
before the nonemergent administration of psychotropic drugs 
is not a ‘service, program, or activity’ of New Jersey from 
which the civilly committed are excluded).  In Furgess, this 
Court concluded that a prison’s “provision of a shower is a 
service, program, or activity.”  933 F.3d at 291 (holding that 
Furgess adequately alleged a Title II claim based on the 
prison’s failure to accommodate his need for a shower).  In 
Bowers, the University of Iowa’s program was its provision of 
athletic scholarships. 475 F.3d at 553 (holding that Bowers 
stated a claim under Title II). 
 Based on Geness’s Second Amended Complaint and his 
arguments before this Court, and because Geness concedes that 
AOPC’s liability cannot be premised on judicial decision-
making, see supra note 12, the only “services, programs, or 
activities” at issue are AOPC’s administrative duties to (1) 
“intervene directly with the Fayette County Court to ensure 
that the Plaintiff’s case moved forward,” and (2) “seek 
intervention for such result by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court.”  Appellee’s Br. 22.  Geness argues that Title II requires 
AOPC to provide him these two services from which he was 
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excluded based on his disability.13  AOPC counters that its 
“enumerated powers” do not authorize it to meddle in “specific 
litigation.”  Appellant’s Br. 33.   
 First, regarding AOPC’s alleged failure to directly 
intervene with the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas, 
Geness acknowledged in his Second Amended Complaint that 
AOPC “repeatedly” made inquiries about the length of his 
detention to the court administrator.  App. 45 ¶¶ 66–67.  But, 
he alleged, AOPC failed to take “any action” beyond those 
inquiries that would “provide [him] with his right to be brought 
to trial.”  App. 45 ¶ 67.  He neither identifies in his Complaint 
nor argues before us what further action AOPC should have or 
could have taken.  And it is difficult to imagine what action it 
could have taken in light of Geness’s concession that AOPC is 
not liable for judges’ decision-making in individual cases.  See 
supra note 12.  Thus, Geness’s allegation of AOPC’s failure to 
directly intervene with the county court in some unspecified 
manner, beyond its repeated inquiries to the court 
administrator, cannot sustain his claim under Title II of the 
ADA.  See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (stating that allegations 
must be more than “speculative” or “conclusory”). 
 
 13  To the extent Geness additionally alleges that AOPC 
had a duty to ensure his motions for habeas corpus relief and 
motions to dismiss the charge against him were heard and ruled 
upon in a timely manner, we conclude that these allegations are 
both dependent on judicial conduct and too speculative to 
sustain his claim because they are not linked to any alleged 
service, program, or activity of AOPC under Pennsylvania 
Rule of Judicial Administration 505 or otherwise.  See supra 
note 12; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
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 This leaves only Geness’s argument that AOPC failed 
to seek intervention from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  He 
does not make this allegation anywhere in his Second 
Amended Complaint.  It stems from AOPC’s “powers and 
duties” enumerated in the Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial 
Administration.  Pa.R.J.A. No. 505.  We will take judicial 
notice of the Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial Administration, as 
they are “matters of public record,” which the District Court 
considered as well.  Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 
256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 5B Charles A. Wright & 
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1357 (3d ed. 
2004)).  AOPC’s duties include, in relevant part:  
(1) To review the operation and 
efficiency of the system and of all 
offices related to and serving the 
system and, when necessary, to 
report to the Supreme Court or the 
Judicial Council with respect 
thereto. . . .  
(6) To examine the state of the 
dockets and practices and 
procedures of the courts and of the 
district justices of the peace and 
make recommendations for the 
expedition of litigation. 
Pa.R.J.A. No. 505(1), (6). 
 The “service, program, or activity” requirement under 
Title II is “extremely broad in scope and includes anything a 
public entity does.”  Furgess, 933 F.3d at 289 (finding that “a 
prison’s provision of showers to inmates fits within this 
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expansive definition”).  Nonetheless, the “service, program, or 
activity” must be one that the entity actually provides.  See, 
e.g., Lane, 541 U.S. at 531 (holding that access to court 
proceedings is a service provided by the state).  This is an 
obvious but important limitation.  For example, in Disability 
Rights, we held that “the provision of judicial process before 
the [forcible] nonemergent administration of psychotropic 
drugs is not a ‘service, program, or activity’ of New Jersey 
from which the civilly committed are excluded.”  796 F.3d at 
305, 307 (stating that this was not a “public service, program, 
or activity to which nondisabled individuals have access”). 
 Our dissenting colleague cites Pa.R.J.A. No. 505(1), (6) 
as the basis of his opinion that Geness has stated a viable Title 
II claim against AOPC.  These provisions, however, do not 
suffice to establish a Title II claim against AOPC.  They charge 
AOPC with “review[ing] the operation and efficiency of the 
system” and reporting to the Supreme Court “when 
necessary”—and with “examin[ing] the state of the dockets 
and practices and procedures of the courts . . . and mak[ing] 
recommendations for the expedition of litigation.”  Pa.R.J.A. 
No. 505(1), (6).  These rules unambiguously require AOPC to 
facilitate an “efficien[t]” and “expeditio[us]” system, in line 
with its role as an administrative body.  They do not task AOPC 
with policing potential civil rights violations in particular 
cases—to do so would task the AOPC with making legal 
determinations and recommendations.  The AOPC is not, and 
should not be, a judicial back-seat driver.  See supra note 12. 
 Geness argues that AOPC’s failure to “seek intervention 
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court” impacted his ability to be 
“timely [tried] on the charges that he faced.”  Appellee’s Br. 
11.  This argument requires some unpacking.  First, he was 
never competent to stand trial throughout his years of 
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detainment—and subjecting him to trial would have violated 
his due process rights.  See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 
354 (1996) (“We have repeatedly and consistently recognized 
that the criminal trial of an incompetent defendant violates due 
process.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Secondly, 
Geness neither alleges nor attempts to argue that AOPC had 
any control over whether he was housed in a prison versus a 
long-term care facility while deemed incompetent.  Thus, with 
his argument properly distilled, Geness is effectively urging 
this Court to hold that AOPC had a duty to seek intervention 
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to have his case dismissed 
before it languished for nine years while he remained 
incompetent and—for reasons both unclear and inexcusable—
remained imprisoned for much of that time.  He makes this 
argument despite acknowledging that he had representation 
and access to the court throughout the years he was imprisoned 
and civilly committed.  See App. 40 ¶¶ 30–31 (stating that 
Geness’s public defender “made no attempt to have [his] case 
removed from the trial list, despite [his] known incompetency 
to stand trial” and despite having “the authority and the 
opportunity to intervene with the Court”); App. 40 ¶¶ 26–27 
(stating that Geness’s case was subject to the court’s “call of 
the list,” whereby his counsel, a district attorney, and a judge 
evaluated the status of his case on a monthly basis).   
 By Geness’s argument, in order for AOPC to comply 
with Title II, it had to suggest to the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court that his case be dismissed because he was not competent 
to stand trial.  AOPC would “in effect . . . be required to closely 
monitor, deeply evaluate, and consider intervening in every 
criminal case pending in the Commonwealth.”  Appellant’s 
Reply 1.  In a case such as this, AOPC argues, “even if aware 
of the procedural status,” it “would not have known whether 
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the extended delay was part of a strategic course by defense 
counsel, the thoughtful deliberative process of the judge, or 
some other factor peculiar to that specific case.”  Appellant’s 
Br. 41.  We find AOPC’s arguments persuasive. 
 Further, AOPC’s powers do not allow it to actually hold 
a criminal trial, which Geness alleges it denied him.  
Appellee’s Br. 15, 25, 26 n.22.  Even had AOPC reported to 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or the Fayette County Court 
of Common Pleas about the delay in Geness’s case, it remained 
the exclusive power of the courts to actually do something 
about it.  
 Relatedly, since Geness was not competent to stand 
trial, a court’s decision regarding whether a case should be 
dismissed depends on the evidence and law underlying the 
charge and the basis for dismissal.  Weighing such matters is 
indisputably a judicial function.  This brings us full circle to 
Geness’s acknowledgement that AOPC does not have a duty 
to meddle with judicial decision-making.  See supra note 12.  
Because judicial decision-making is not a service AOPC 
provides to either disabled or nondisabled individuals, Geness 
was not excluded from this service based on his disability.  See 
Disability Rights, 769 F.3d at 305. 
 Further, Title II requires not only that a public entity 
“excluded” a disabled individual from a service it provides but 
also that such an exclusion was “by reason of his disability.”  
Geness, 902 F.3d at 361 (quoting Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 
171, 178–79 (3d Cir. 2018) and citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132).  
Neither Geness nor the dissent sets forth a plausible allegation 
or argument regarding how AOPC neglected to report the delay 
in his case to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court “by reason of 
his disability.”  Id.  While his case appears to have languished 
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due to his disability (i.e., while he was incompetent to stand 
trial),  AOPC had no power over the disposition of his case, 
and there is simply no allegation or argument before us 
regarding how AOPC’s alleged failure to contact the Supreme 
Court connects to Geness’s disability.   
 For the reasons set forth above, Geness’s allegations 
against AOPC fail to satisfy the first requirement of Georgia—
setting forth a plausible Title II claim.  We therefore hold that 
Congress has not validly abrogated AOPC’s sovereign 
immunity regarding this particular claim.  In conclusion, we 
will reverse the District Court’s judgment and remand this case 
for dismissal of the claim against AOPC.  Though we exclude 
AOPC as a potentially responsible party, the human suffering 
endured by Geness due to the mishandling of his case cannot 
be overstated.  This opinion does not impact Geness’s claims 
against the Commonwealth and DHS, which are not currently 
before us. 
Craig Geness v. Administrative Office of Pa., et al 
No. 19-2253 
                                                                                                                                                
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting 
 
The blink response to a suit against a clerk’s office is 
that this cannot be.  It is simply counterintuitive.  Thus I easily 
understand why my colleagues believe it correct to reverse 
Judge Kearney’s decision.  See Geness v. Pennsylvania, 388 F. 
Supp. 3d 530 (W.D. Pa. 2019) (emphasis omitted).  But at the 
motion-to-dismiss stage in this Les Misérables scenario, I am 
persuaded by his well-reasoned analysis.  Thus I would affirm 
and hold that Craig Geness has pled facts sufficient to abrogate 
the sovereign immunity of the Administrative Office of 
Pennsylvania Courts (“AOPC”) for purposes of his claims 
under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 
42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq., and the Fourteenth Amendment.   
 
The majority opinion recites well the tragic facts in this 
case.  Mr. Geness languished in custody without a trial for over 
nine years before the case against him was dropped because he 
would never be competent to stand trial and substantial 
evidentiary issues impaired the Commonwealth’s prosecution.  
This came after it was determined early on that he was 
incompetent and unlikely to improve, and while four separate 
motions for habeas corpus relief and motions to dismiss were 
pending (without a hearing or ruling on any of them).  To say 
that Mr. Geness suffered a grave injustice at the hands of the 
system for justice is inadequate.  There are no words.    
 
My colleagues in the majority conclude that Mr. Geness 
has failed to satisfy the first requirement of the three-prong test 
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outlined in United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006).  
They hold that he did not state a plausible Title II claim because 
he did not allege that the AOPC denied him “the benefits of 
[its] services, programs, or activities . . . by reason of his 
disability.”  Geness v. Cox, 902 F.3d 344, 361 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(quoting Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 178–79 (3d Cir. 
2018), and citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132).   
 
In my view, Mr. Geness clearly identifies the provisions 
of Pennsylvania law that tasked the AOPC with monitoring the 
criminal docket and reporting failures directly to the 
Commonwealth’s Supreme Court.  And he alleges that the 
AOPC’s failure to perform those tasks substantially, if not 
exclusively, led to his unconscionable and lengthy pretrial 
detention.  I rely on the same law and portions of Mr. Geness’s 
Second Amended Complaint as my colleagues to reach this 
opposite conclusion.   
 
Sections (1) and (6) of Rule 505 of the Pennsylvania 
Rules of Judicial Administration (“Pa. R.J.A.”) charge the 
AOPC with “review[ing] the operation and efficiency of the 
system and of all offices related to and serving the system and, 
when necessary . . . [,] report[ing] to the [Commonwealth] 
Supreme Court or the Judicial Council with respect thereto,” 
Pa. R.J.A. No. 505(1), and “examin[ing] the state of the 
dockets and practices and procedures of the courts and of the 
magisterial district judges and mak[ing] recommendations for 
the expedition of litigation,” id. No. 505(6).   
 
Mr. Geness alleges that the AOPC “makes regular 
inquiries of each county’s ADA coordinator with regard to 
cases involving criminal defendants who are pretrial detainees 
whose cases have not been called to trial in a timely fashion,” 
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App. 45 ¶ 66, and that it in fact “repeatedly contacted the 
Fayette County court administrator directly to inquire about 
[Mr. Geness’s] case and the reasons for the . . . extended 
incarceration without trial,” App. 45 ¶ 67.  It, however, took no 
further action “designed to provide [him] with his right to be 
brought to trial on the charges that he faced.”  Id.  Additionally, 
he alleges that during his incarceration “the Fayette County 
court administrator received . . . a daily list of prisoners 
incarcerated in the Fayette County Prison . . . , including the 
date that [each] individual was incarcerated, as well as the 
minimum and maximum incarceration dates for each . . . .”  
App. 45–46 ¶ 69.  Mr. Geness appeared on each list.  App. 46 
¶ 70. 
 
Based on the directives in the Pennsylvania Rules of 
Judicial Administration and Mr. Geness’s allegations that the 
AOPC failed to provide him the services of monitoring the 
docket and reporting the delay in his case to the 
Commonwealth Supreme Court directly, he has plausibly pled 
a claim based on Title II of the ADA.  “[T]he phrase service, 
program, or activity under Title II . . . is extremely broad in 
scope and includes anything a public entity does.”  Furgess v. 
Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 933 F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 2019) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  My colleagues do not 
explain why monitoring the criminal dockets and reporting 
issues up to the Supreme Court does not satisfy this definition 
of “service,” nor why they discount Mr. Geness’s allegations 
that he was denied the service of having the AOPC flag the 
extreme delay in his case directly to that Supreme Court.   
 
Mr. Geness does not propose that the AOPC had to 
guarantee specific results, or dictate to Commonwealth judges 
how to rule in any particular case, or grant him any form of 
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judicial relief.  He asserts that the AOPC had the duty to 
monitor the state of the dockets, which it did, and seek 
intervention by the Supreme Court, which it failed to do.  
Neither the AOPC nor my colleagues cite to any case or 
provision of law that would have barred the AOPC from 
fulfilling its obligations under the Pennsylvania Rules of 
Judicial Administration.  Rule 505 provides the basis for the 
AOPC to ring the alarm in cases like the one before us.  And 
to say that it had an obligation to make a recommendation to 
expedite litigation where there was a nearly decade delay is not 
the same as arguing that the AOPC has an obligation to 
intervene in every pending criminal case.  There was nothing 
ordinary about the procedural posture of this case.1   
 
1  My colleagues also conclude that Mr. Geness failed to 
allege that the AOPC intentionally discriminated against him 
“by reason of his disability,” as is required to state an ADA 
claim.  Geness v. Cox, 902 F.3d 344, 361 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(quoting Haberle, 885 F.3d at 178–79 and citing 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12132).  They acknowledge that the element of intentional 
discrimination is met when a plaintiff alleges “deliberate 
indifference,” which requires “(1) knowledge that a federally 
protected right is substantially likely to be violated . . . and (2) 
failure to act despite that knowledge.”  Haberle, 885 F.3d at 
181 (citation omitted).  But they do not explain how it is that 
Mr. Geness did not sufficiently plead knowledge by the AOPC 
that his rights were being violated when he in fact alleges that 
during the period of his incarceration the court administrator 
received a daily list of prisoners that included his name, the 
duration of his incarceration, and the status of his case, App. 
45–46, and that the AOPC repeatedly inquired about the status 
of his case, App. 45.  Nor do they explain why Mr. Geness did 
not sufficiently plead failure to act when he does allege that the 
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Any concern about whether the AOPC actually had the 
ability to take further action on behalf of Mr. Geness is a matter 
for discovery.  As the District Court pointed out, “a developed 
factual record may show, as a matter of fact, the AOPC could 
not have done more.”  Geness, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 535.  But 
how can we say at this stage that the AOPC does not in fact 
have mechanisms and procedures in place to ensure that cases 
like the one before us do not slip through the cracks?  How can 
we say that it did not, in the past, alert up the chain on behalf 




AOPC, despite knowledge of the delay in his case, failed to 
intervene with the Supreme Court on his behalf as it was 
authorized to do under Pennsylvania’s Rules of Judicial 
Administration.  Id.    
The argument that the AOPC had no power over the 
disposition of Mr. Geness’s case, and thus did not cause the 
delay, misses the point.  Under our case law, a successful ADA 
claim only requires the plaintiff to show but-for causation.  CG 
v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 734 F.3d 229, 236 n.11 (3d Cir. 
2013).  Mr. Geness does not have to allege or ultimately prove 
that the AOPC alone caused the rights violation he 
suffered.  See Furgess v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 933 F.3d 285, 291 
n.25 (3d Cir. 2019).  At the pleading stage, he has more than 
sufficiently alleged that the AOPC’s failure to act on his behalf 
substantially caused and contributed to the delay in his 
case.   And what ultimately transpired internally at the AOPC 
with respect to Mr. Geness’s case is something he should have 
the opportunity to determine through discovery.  That, 
however, remains a mystery, as we now cut short his case 
against that agency.  
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We are to construe complaints so “as to do substantial 
justice.”  Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f)).  Mr. Geness’s allegations more 
than suffice at this stage, and given the harrowing ordeal he 
endured at the hands of the judicial system, it would be a 
further injustice not to allow his suit against the AOPC (the 
very agency with the duty to monitor the dockets and report up 
any issues) to continue.  To do otherwise is to define adequacy 
down.  I respectfully dissent.   
